The portfolio lost 4.5% for the month of November, bringing our year-to-date return to 13.5%.* We are sorry to hand in such a disappointing setback, one which destroys months of steady performance and is close to the maximum total monthly loss we feel we can accept.
What happened? Mainly, the S&P gained 6.2% over the month, while we are short about half of our portfolio gross value. Our various equity longs, including China, generally underperformed the index. Gold had a pretty good month, trading up 12.8%, though we missed out on a part of that after closing our position. At a point where people seem to believe that gold can not possibly decline, we felt uncomfortable holding it any longer. Gold doesn't generate income, after all. Take an ounce of it, put it in a safe, come back ten years later and you still have an ounce of gold. Our bond portfolio didn't do much over the month, making a slight gain. Oil stayed flat as well.
Is it time to reevaluate our equity short? Yes - actually it is. The January barometer hasn't worked (so far) this year. Work we have recently seen indicates it is a good idea to be long into year end and through January, so we will be heading back to a long-equity stance. We still think our short rates position / long inflation position makes a lot of sense.
* We report the percentage gain or loss during a month in an additive sense for ease of comparison, however the year-to-date returns are reported as a chained series. As the total return become greater, and as inflows have an effect on the portfolio, the two will diverge. Adding up the monthly returns for the year may not give the precise total return.
15 Dec 2009
17 Nov 2009
Small-C October 2009 Letter
The portfolio returned 1.6% for the month of October, bringing our year-to-date return to 18.0%.*
* We report the percentage gain or loss during a month in an additive sense for ease of comparison, however the year-to-date returns are reported as a chained series. As the total return become greater, and as inflows have an effect on the portfolio, the two will diverge. Adding up the monthly returns for the year may not give the precise total return.
* We report the percentage gain or loss during a month in an additive sense for ease of comparison, however the year-to-date returns are reported as a chained series. As the total return become greater, and as inflows have an effect on the portfolio, the two will diverge. Adding up the monthly returns for the year may not give the precise total return.
Small-C September 2009 Letter
The portfolio returned 4.9% for the month of September, bringing our year-to-date return to 16.4%.*
* We report the percentage gain or loss during a month in an additive sense for ease of comparison, however the year-to-date returns are reported as a chained series. As the total return become greater, and as inflows have an effect on the portfolio, the two will diverge. Adding up the monthly returns for the year may not give the precise total return.
16 Sept 2009
Small-C July & August 2009 Letter
The portfolio lost 0.1% for the month of July, bringing our year-to date return to 16.1%. The portfolio lost 4.7% for the month of August, bringing our year-to date return to 11.5%.* We are disappointed to hand in two losing months in a row, especially one of the magnitude of our August loss. It is perhaps overly simplistic to note that our shorts outperformed our longs - though fundamentally that's what happened. The market rose, while China didn't. Corporate bond spreads tightened, but yields fell as well. Gold didn't do much of anything, while neither did oil.
In July, we took the step of adding two single-share relative value trades to the portfolio. You may remember we swore off single stocks some time mid last year, and that in the early months of 2009 we had great confidence that this year’s returns would come from asset allocation. As the market felt to be in a recovery mode, with shares bounding upward and bid/asks narrowing in many sectors, we thought it was a good time to get into relative value. Certainly we had been surprised by the rapid recovery in equity prices, but couldn’t we at least capture some profits from laggards in the rally? We invested in two stocks, which appeared quite reasonably valued and potentially able to benefit from continued stock market strength. On that trade, we have experienced our fastest loss rate of any position so far this year. We are considering increasing the size of our trade.
We are sad to report we have lost our confidence in the “science” of economics. Until recently, we had an unwavering faith in a classical, Adam Smith-type economic model. Then suddenly the penny dropped. To be considered valid, a scientific theory must not only have explanatory power, but also predictive power. Our classical model of economics appears to have great explanatory power, but outside the most facile cases is useless for predicting future effects. What do we do now? Become complete economic nihilists? We're trying to get through Keynes as a bit of self-help, but he's not quite the entertainer Smith was.
* We report the percentage gain or loss during a month in an additive sense for ease of comparison, however the year-to-date returns are reported as a chained series. As the total return become greater, and as inflows have an effect on the portfolio, the two will diverge. Adding up the monthly returns for the year may not give the precise total return.
In July, we took the step of adding two single-share relative value trades to the portfolio. You may remember we swore off single stocks some time mid last year, and that in the early months of 2009 we had great confidence that this year’s returns would come from asset allocation. As the market felt to be in a recovery mode, with shares bounding upward and bid/asks narrowing in many sectors, we thought it was a good time to get into relative value. Certainly we had been surprised by the rapid recovery in equity prices, but couldn’t we at least capture some profits from laggards in the rally? We invested in two stocks, which appeared quite reasonably valued and potentially able to benefit from continued stock market strength. On that trade, we have experienced our fastest loss rate of any position so far this year. We are considering increasing the size of our trade.
We are sad to report we have lost our confidence in the “science” of economics. Until recently, we had an unwavering faith in a classical, Adam Smith-type economic model. Then suddenly the penny dropped. To be considered valid, a scientific theory must not only have explanatory power, but also predictive power. Our classical model of economics appears to have great explanatory power, but outside the most facile cases is useless for predicting future effects. What do we do now? Become complete economic nihilists? We're trying to get through Keynes as a bit of self-help, but he's not quite the entertainer Smith was.
* We report the percentage gain or loss during a month in an additive sense for ease of comparison, however the year-to-date returns are reported as a chained series. As the total return become greater, and as inflows have an effect on the portfolio, the two will diverge. Adding up the monthly returns for the year may not give the precise total return.
From the Archive: Small-C June 2009 Letter
The portfolio returned 0.1% for the month, bringing our year-to date return to 16.2%. We were within a rounding error of flat, which is slightly disappointing, but not greatly so. This note is so late because we had trouble coming up with good commentary for the month and now July is nearly over as well. On present form, we are looking at a very similar month to June. Clearly some of the momentum we had in the portfolio earlier this year has run out.
From the Archive: Small-C May 2009 Letter
The portfolio returned 5.3% for the month, bringing our year-to date return to 16.1%.There was little change in our positioning, as laid out previously. The strength in the equity market, however, begs a few questions:
Why are we short equities? This we had the opportunity to participate in an excellent exercise which forced us to think hard about the case for which direction to pick in equities. Our main conclusion was that that many convincing arguments can be held up for either side. Our personal view draws from the following:
Why are we short equities? This we had the opportunity to participate in an excellent exercise which forced us to think hard about the case for which direction to pick in equities. Our main conclusion was that that many convincing arguments can be held up for either side. Our personal view draws from the following:
- Unemployment is still rising and will continue to do so. Entire sectors as yet untouched by layoffs must inevitably contract, and reduce the productive capacity well into next year. However, we must recognize that unemployment has no predictive power to equity returns
- Barack Obama and his administration are increasing government interference in private life at a furious pace. We want to like Obama. His foreign policy holds out great promise, but in terms of expanding government he already looks worse than George Bush - which is saying a lot. We have to admit, though, that equity markets reliably outperform during Democratic administrations.
- The Other January Effect, which we have written about before. However, new study has shown that the dominant strategy is to be in cash after a down January, not short the market.
- Demographics. There are some 80mn baby boomers on the verge of retirement. We are led to believe they had a great deal of their retirement savings invested in stock. They have been badly hurt by the last year’s equity declines. They want to exit the equity market, either to protect what they still have left, or to have cash to spend in retirement. The buyer for their equities is the less-numerous, cash-strapped younger generation.
- We just don’t see the value in owning equity. There are endless arguments to be made around a correct valuation; the only thing we have to guide us is a feeling that equity just doesn’t offer the right ratio of pleasure to pain in the owning of it. Sure, interest rates are low, but there are plenty of vehicles to earn an acceptable, contractually defined yield. Sure, we could miss out on a 20% gain, but we don’t feel we desperately need that 20% gain when set against the very real possibility of losing 20%. Incidentally, we think the world is moving into a sustainable "dividend yields greater than bond yields" environment of the type that existed prior to 1960.
Why are we long China? We often hear analysts express a view that China is / will be an economic powerhouse because it lacks the constraints of a democratic political system. When the communist party decides to, for example, build out highways or increase consumption of domestic cigarettes, it sends out a diktat and its will is done. China has elevated 500 million people out of poverty in a generation - what can’t it do? We think there is a naïve, pernicious idealism behind that view. More Chinese may have risen out of poverty in the last generation than any other nation, but standards of living are well behind those in the Western world. When Chairman Mao conceived his Great Leap Forward, the result of this government-ordered investment program was uncounted millions of deaths by starvation. Most Westerners of our generation have no experience of even the slightest worry that there might not be food for a day and can not come close to imagining the horror of entire cities starving. We’ll take our democratic process, thank you, which is precisely why we like China. We believe that China does indeed have 50 years of strong growth ahead of it, that the gains of the last decade have been due precisely to a opening of the Chinese political system, and that increasing information, growing freedom, and economic success will tie up in a virtuous cycle.
Why are we long inflation? We believe Adam Smith, who in 1776 wrote "for in every country of the world, I believe, the avarice and injustice of princes and sovereign states, abusing the confidence of their subjects, have by degrees diminished the real quantity of metal, which had been originally contained in their coin". And we believe Milton Friedman who in 1956 reminded us "Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon".Major western governments have begun to print money, supposedly to "stimulate the economy", by increasing government expenditure programs using newly issued debt. And if no one wants that debt, what do they do? Well, becoming a fantastic Ouroboros, the government itself buys it. What they are doing, and they surely realize this but can not state it explicitly, is using inflation to 1) reduce the real value of debts (and therefore redistribute wealth from lenders to borrowers) and 2) expropriate the hard-earned savings of the thrifty and older, to support the young and irresponsible. Inflation is a more subtle way of doing this than explicit expropriation or rising taxation - though governments are doing that as well - a move which will serve to redistribute power to the politicians and bureaucrats, not, as stated, to redistribute wealth to those disadvantaged by the current downturn. Does that sound outrageous? It should. If you played by the rules for last decade and were successful, your winnings are being stolen.
What are our investment goals? What is our benchmark? We have never set in writing either of these rather important concepts. Our investment goal is to increase capital at a rate significantly greater than inflation over the long term. How long? The figure we have in our head is 60 years. Being realistic, that implies we hope not to access this capital within our lifetime. Our long-term benchmark is 0% or the S&P 500 return, whichever is greater. We hope to preserve capital, but consider ourselves risk-tolerant - a 20% loss in year would not make us greatly uncomfortable.
A corollary to the "P-side Theory of GDP": Among market commentators, it is popular to say that the drop in wealth, across house prices, stocks, pensions, what have you, that we have experienced over the last year will lead people to adjust to more frugal standards of living, and because of that economic growth will be impaired for years to come. Jeremy Grantham makes a representative summary: "No longer as rich as we thought - under-saved, under-pensioned, and realizing it - we will enter a less indulgent world, if a more realistic one, in which life is to be lived more frugally." Hmmm. We don’t quite buy the argument. Nowhere does he mention that we will work harder as well. Imagine that over the last several years, people were in some measure living off of wealth they believed was stored in various assets. We don’t dispute that - the popularity of home equity loans indicates they probably were. Now, that source of consumption has disappeared. True as well. We dispute the conclusion that inevitably this leads to reduced consumption and therefore GDP. Certainly, over some horizon, people will be more careful with money. But aren’t they also spurred to produce income, where before they consumed assets? We think this change in asset values brings the producer back online, and GDP can indeed start to grow again. Isn’t that all a bit contradictory to our whole bearish stance? Somewhat, we admit, but part of our argument is valuation as well, which we believe will remain lowered for long after economic grow restarts.
From the Archive: Small-C April 2009 Letter
The portfolio returned 4.1% for the month, bringing our year-to date return to 10.8%. The big story from April was the 7.8% equity rally. So, uh, great we managed to earn a bit more than half the market return for the month. This was disturbing, not because we missed out on a larger gain, but because it was positive at all: the portfolio was supposed to be short equity, and the performance leaves us wondering if our portfolio construction is really as clever as we think. Have we been deceiving ourselves, thinking we are short the market while actually being long? Probably. After increasing our short early in the month, we were indeed very short true equity instruments. However, when we add up the betas on gold, oil, and corporate bonds, we found the short is very small or even a net long. We plan to increase the equity short again in May, and will continue until we lose money on days when the market is up. The following chart helps us track exactly where the returns have come from so far this year. Some of our smaller trades (like nuclear and Asia) have made meaningful contributions. We take that as an indication that they are appropriately sized. The percentages add up to 10.8%.
Why were the markets up in April? One factor must be that many companies posted Q1 earnings that either met or exceeded analysts’ expectations, though those expectations represented a huge decline from a year ago and even from earlier in the quarter. Also, many companies - especially in the financial sector - put large losses in the non-recurring category, which makes headline earnings look quite a bit better. Stories from the financial sector were less panicky than they had been for much of the past year, possibly leading investors to believe the shocks are behind us.
A big theme during the month was the "stress tests" that the US government implemented to judge any potential capital requirements US financial institutions faced. For the life of us, we can’t figure out why anyone is paying any attention to this. Bank shareholders, boards, and management teams (who really had an interest in doing so) weren’t able to figure out the right level of capitalization for their institutions. The ratings agencies and regulators (who are intelligent and well-meaning) couldn’t do it. So why would anyone lend a penny of credence to a group of bureaucrats directed by politicians? Possibly because the results might foreshadow how much more political interference the US is in for, though we didn’t hear that view expressed. From what we’ve seen so far, the US is in for a lot more political intervention. Witness President Obama’s public scolding of investment firms for having the audacity to argue for their contractual (constitutional) rights.
The "P-side theory" of GDP and recessions: this is open to critique, ridicule even, but it is our simplified working model of the economic climate. The focus of much economic discussion revolves are "the consumer" and whether or not this allegorical figure will spend or save. Why is this? It’s hard to measure production directly but mathematically, GDP = consumption + gross investment + government spending + (exports − imports). Consumption is the largest, most variable quantity in the equation, so economists spend a lot of time trying to forecast consumption, which leads to focus on "the consumer". But rarely is "the producer" ever mentioned - even though it is her activity which GDP actually measures. "The producer" and "the consumer" are, of course, one and the same - but they have diametrically opposed motivations. We think that over the last several years of expansion, the producer has been working hard. She has increased productivity to the point where she does not have any obvious avenues to further gains. She has grown satiated, complacent, and a little tired. She feels she has built up the savings/borrowing capacity/social benefits to withstand some time off. GDP won’t begin to recover until the producer feels motivated to go out and produce something.
Finally, a friend noted that had we just gone long at the beginning of the month, we would have made huge gains. Actually, if we had applied leverage to that, we could have made even huger gains. Very true indeed. However, as we’re not comfortable predicting the short-term, or any-term for that matter, swings in the market, we are happy if we can make some gains out of positions which ex-ante make sense. We value probability over prognostication, statistical significance over sophistry. Our friend still owes us £100.
Why were the markets up in April? One factor must be that many companies posted Q1 earnings that either met or exceeded analysts’ expectations, though those expectations represented a huge decline from a year ago and even from earlier in the quarter. Also, many companies - especially in the financial sector - put large losses in the non-recurring category, which makes headline earnings look quite a bit better. Stories from the financial sector were less panicky than they had been for much of the past year, possibly leading investors to believe the shocks are behind us.
A big theme during the month was the "stress tests" that the US government implemented to judge any potential capital requirements US financial institutions faced. For the life of us, we can’t figure out why anyone is paying any attention to this. Bank shareholders, boards, and management teams (who really had an interest in doing so) weren’t able to figure out the right level of capitalization for their institutions. The ratings agencies and regulators (who are intelligent and well-meaning) couldn’t do it. So why would anyone lend a penny of credence to a group of bureaucrats directed by politicians? Possibly because the results might foreshadow how much more political interference the US is in for, though we didn’t hear that view expressed. From what we’ve seen so far, the US is in for a lot more political intervention. Witness President Obama’s public scolding of investment firms for having the audacity to argue for their contractual (constitutional) rights.
The "P-side theory" of GDP and recessions: this is open to critique, ridicule even, but it is our simplified working model of the economic climate. The focus of much economic discussion revolves are "the consumer" and whether or not this allegorical figure will spend or save. Why is this? It’s hard to measure production directly but mathematically, GDP = consumption + gross investment + government spending + (exports − imports). Consumption is the largest, most variable quantity in the equation, so economists spend a lot of time trying to forecast consumption, which leads to focus on "the consumer". But rarely is "the producer" ever mentioned - even though it is her activity which GDP actually measures. "The producer" and "the consumer" are, of course, one and the same - but they have diametrically opposed motivations. We think that over the last several years of expansion, the producer has been working hard. She has increased productivity to the point where she does not have any obvious avenues to further gains. She has grown satiated, complacent, and a little tired. She feels she has built up the savings/borrowing capacity/social benefits to withstand some time off. GDP won’t begin to recover until the producer feels motivated to go out and produce something.
Finally, a friend noted that had we just gone long at the beginning of the month, we would have made huge gains. Actually, if we had applied leverage to that, we could have made even huger gains. Very true indeed. However, as we’re not comfortable predicting the short-term, or any-term for that matter, swings in the market, we are happy if we can make some gains out of positions which ex-ante make sense. We value probability over prognostication, statistical significance over sophistry. Our friend still owes us £100.
From the Archive: Small-C March 2009 Letter
The portfolio returned 3.5% for the month, bringing our year-to-date return to +6.7%.nbsp; Much of the action took place the week of March 16th, when the US Federal Reserve announced its plan to begin buying treasuries. It was a moment we had been salivating over all year. Yields (though not spreads so much) on our corporate bonds squeezed lower, gold and crude moved up, and we were presented with precisely the moment we were waiting for to short treasuries. Sterling corporate bonds, though, still didn’t perform much over the month which is starting to bother us. The S&P trended upward, but more slowly than Asia-related equities, and failed to breach the boundaries of the wide strangle we sold, while implied volatilities moved down. So nearly everything in the book was working. And that meant that even the best moments were pretty boring - the natural result of our decision to pursue safe yield over the year. It was one of those months where we wished we had made bigger bets.
We have no clueas to when to cut or increase our commodities exposures and so will probably hold them for a year to gain the tax benefit.
We made three trades during the month. We sold puts on the S&P at 600, we incrementally increased our S&P short at 830, and we went short long-dated treasuries. We feel the book couldn’t be much better-positioned, which brings an interesting conundrum: if a book is well-positioned for likely future scenarios, it shouldn’t need adjustment. But clearly the world changes every day, so shouldn’t that necessitate constant adjustment? Whatever.nbsp; Frequent adjustment is costly enough from transaction and tax standpoints that we prefer to believe it’s not important.
Over the month of April, we will look to add to our equity short if the bear-market rally continues. We’re not technicians, but the 830 S&P level is important to us because of the Other January Effect we have written about before. We will also be thinking about how to add a bit of leverage to the book - the cash position is currently more conservative than we would wish. With any luck, implied volatilities will increase to the point where we can sell options again; so far we have maintained a disciplined approach to selling volatility only when it looks expensive and it has paid off.
For those of you who are asking how big the bets are, we came up with the following representation of our positioning. A traditional portfolio manager would tend to think of the book like the first column, at option delta. However, since we do not hedge option positions dynamically and intend to hold them to maturity, we think about options as if we had the entire exposure invested, the second column. This illustrates that our book is a bit short equities today (though long beta), but becomes long equities in the future if the price becomes more reasonable, while being long fixed income instruments and inflation - but roughly neutral rates (the duration of the net position should be low-ish).
Mob rule continues. The American Congress debated, though did not pass, a bill that would tax executive bonuses at 90%. Congress also called on financial services companies to release names of individuals who had been granted bonuses in 2008, an act seemingly in violation of employees’ confidentiality, and one which could, quite literally, endanger those individuals to action by lynch mobs. President Obama stated on television that he believes US citizens should pursue productive professions like engineering, not finance, though he refrained from endorsing Congress’ 90% bonus tax. Do these facts make you feel inclined to invest in the US as a stable, democratic country, ruled by law? Us neither. Perhaps the reality will prove to be less biting than the rhetoric. Some of what President Obama says, like a statement that "auto companies will not become wards of the state" is quite sensible, while other things like "from this day forward, your US car warranty is guaranteed by the US government" are just off the wall. These are just small flotsam that we happened to pick out of the politico-financial maelstrom swirling through the media this month but much of it sounds similar.
One thing we are sure of is that as long as politicians continue to erode freedom in the markets and stand in the way of reconstruction, as long as the media focuses on finance, and as long as commentators pine for a return to "normality", there will be no durable rebound in asset valuations.
From the Archive: Small-C February 2009 Letter
The portfolio returned a measly 1%, bringing year-to-date performance to +3.2%. Most every trade was down, so the only thing helping us out is our net short on S&P. We took a pasting on our investments in sterling corporate bonds, which leaves us totally perplexed since sterling bonds are supposed to have outperformed over the month. Some commentators have even been speaking about a bubble in corporate bonds. It may have something to do with marks and NAV on the two funds we are invested in. We bought an individual bond for the first time ever: Citigroup senior unsecured 5.1% notes of Sep-2011, at a 10% yield, which seems like a pretty good return for government risk. Once again, we were reminded how astoundingly difficult it is for retail investors to buy corporate bonds.
Bonds are a simple investment. You lend some money to a company, it promises to pay you back with some interest on top. The bonds lasts a determined number of years, at the end of which you either get your money or you don’t. You can be sure the company will try pretty hard to pay you back since if it doesn’t that more or less means going out of business. Contrast that with an equity investment, where there is no representation or promise at all, only a share in the fortunes of the company after everyone else with an interest is paid first. To appraise the value of that investment, you have to make assumptions that stretch indefinitely into the future - out to infinity. I would think bonds would be extremely popular, and that the regulatory framework would push retail investors towards bonds. But that’s just not the case. You can’t trade bonds on the Internet, only via old-school telephone brokers who give a market 5-10 points wide and won’t take a limit order to work. The regulators won’t even allow ordinary investors buy those which are at the riskier end of the spectrum, while the issuers make it as difficult as possible as well, by often issuing bonds at high minimum sizes. There are endless books, newspaper columns, even TV channels about speculating on the stock markets. Bonds get the rare mention.
Bonds are a simple investment. You lend some money to a company, it promises to pay you back with some interest on top. The bonds lasts a determined number of years, at the end of which you either get your money or you don’t. You can be sure the company will try pretty hard to pay you back since if it doesn’t that more or less means going out of business. Contrast that with an equity investment, where there is no representation or promise at all, only a share in the fortunes of the company after everyone else with an interest is paid first. To appraise the value of that investment, you have to make assumptions that stretch indefinitely into the future - out to infinity. I would think bonds would be extremely popular, and that the regulatory framework would push retail investors towards bonds. But that’s just not the case. You can’t trade bonds on the Internet, only via old-school telephone brokers who give a market 5-10 points wide and won’t take a limit order to work. The regulators won’t even allow ordinary investors buy those which are at the riskier end of the spectrum, while the issuers make it as difficult as possible as well, by often issuing bonds at high minimum sizes. There are endless books, newspaper columns, even TV channels about speculating on the stock markets. Bonds get the rare mention.
In his annual note, Warren Buffett opined on the Government bailouts:
"This debilitating spiral has spurred our government to take massive action. In poker terms, the Treasury and the Fed have gone 'all in.' Economic medicine that was previously meted out by the cupful has recently been dispensed by the barrel. These once-unthinkable dosages will almost certainly bring on unwelcome aftereffects. Their precise nature is anyone’s guess, though one likely consequence is an onslaught of inflation. Moreover, major industries have become dependent on Federal assistance, and they will be followed by cities and states bearing mind-boggling requests. Weaning these entities from the public teat will be a political challenge. They won’t leave willingly."
We felt inspired to look at some data to see if, empirically, government bailouts should be expected to work.
We felt inspired to look at some data to see if, empirically, government bailouts should be expected to work.
-----------------
A Naïve View on Government Stimulus Packages
A Naïve View on Government Stimulus Packages
Many market participants accept that a government stimulus package to financial industry, housing markets, consumers, and/or general industry is necessary to restart the world economy and get us through the current rough spot. My simple mind thinks these two graphs ought to inform the debate. They present per Capita GDP, on the first graph, and GDP growth since 1980 on the second, versus a measure of government spending as a percentage of GDP (so higher number = more government involvement). The size of the bubble relates to the size of the economy. (Data sourced from CIA Factbook, The Economic Freedom Institute, and the IMF) If government intervention works, you would expect to see these graphs slope up to the right, indicating more government involvement in the economy leads to higher per capita GDP and higher long-term growth.
sorry - we haven't yet figured out how to include the image
This chart is inconclusive. The broad shape of the graph indicates government involvement may indeed work. But it also contains some counter-intuitive points - for example that China has low government involvement. There may be problems with the measure, government budget as a percentage of GDP. Other forms of economic involvement, like direct control and government-sponsored enterprise, aren’t captured. On broader measures of economic freedom, China scores much worse. The chart can also be divided into two groupings. For developing nations, a higher government budget has a positive effect. Across developed nations, government involvement has a negative effect on per capita GDP.
sorry - we haven't yet figured out how to include the image
This chart is inconclusive. The broad shape of the graph indicates government involvement may indeed work. But it also contains some counter-intuitive points - for example that China has low government involvement. There may be problems with the measure, government budget as a percentage of GDP. Other forms of economic involvement, like direct control and government-sponsored enterprise, aren’t captured. On broader measures of economic freedom, China scores much worse. The chart can also be divided into two groupings. For developing nations, a higher government budget has a positive effect. Across developed nations, government involvement has a negative effect on per capita GDP.
sorry - we haven't yet figured out how to include the image
This chart shows a more pronounced trend - over the last 27 years, countries with less government involvement in the economy grew more. China is literally off the chart at 1289%. But again, we have to contend with problematic data points like China’s low apparent government involvement.
There may be better ways to looks at this data; I certainly appreciate suggestions. There may also be better data to use - some will suggest that GDP is a purely material measure of a nation’s wellbeing and other, less tangible matters such as cultural output, level of education, and sense of happiness should be included. But those people probably aren’t concerned about whether the stock market goes up or down.
The conclusion I am inclined to draw is that government involvement in the economy is bad in the long term. The market won’t stop going down until investors are convinced that governments have stopped trying to stimulate the economy by meddling with the efficient allocation of capital and damaging prospects for future growth.
-----------------
Mr. Buffett also noted "Whether we’re talking about socks or stocks, I like buying quality merchandise when it is marked down." Can it be a coincidence that just days before this letter came out we followed a colleague’s tip and bought 14 pairs of socks for £15? Our current positioning sees us covering most of our S&P short at 700 (going from slightly short to +25% AUM in stocks), then up to +50% AUM in stocks at 600. No particular reason for the levels, really, just that many valuation measures will be suggesting that stocks are on the cheapish side, though not extremely cheap. We are convinced that holding on to "safe" investments, like cash and treasuries, will eventually prove to be a disastrous mistake.
We had a look at a buy-to-let property on our street this month. There are many observations, but simplistically, to earn a decent return on our equity investment, the price would have to fall about 40% from the offer (which isn’t far from peak 2007 valuations). Otherwise, there are far more rewarding, more liquid, less-troublesome places to put our cash. The estate agent was entirely uncomprehending; it appears that property "investors" have no concept of comparing returns across investment classes. This is great news: they will help make us rich.
Also, we won £100 off Rajat this month.
Also, we won £100 off Rajat this month.
From the Archive: Small-C January 2009 Letter
There’s not much to say about January’s performance, but we’ll ramble on for a bit anyways. The portfolio returned 2.2%, which is barely distinguishable from noise. TIPS did well, as 5yr inflation breakevens moved from -0.5% to +0.1%. Gold moved up slightly. China outperformed the S&P, but it was really our net short in S&P that helped there. Put options we sold on the S&P expired worthless. We bought sterling corporate bonds, which didn’t do much of anything during the month. While most of the general themes seemed to be working, many individual positions were down, leaving us with the feeling we could have chosen more wisely.
As January was the worst S&P return on record, we are increasing our short in February. VIX levels have made selling volatility marginally attractive, so we are using the options market for that view. We’re hoping to take in 2-5% of AUM in option premium this year.
Our colleagues, and really anyone we talk to, remain unconcerned about inflation. They have a point - there are no indications that prices will start to move up. But politicians are ascendant and mob rule is the order of the day. The mob of unworthy borrowers, imprudent chancers, and inefficient industries wants a bailout and will get one at the expense of those who worked hard and saved prudently. One of the first things they are doing is pilfering your savings, by keeping rates low and printing money. Inflation will come; the thing we are concerned about is whether they will game CPI so it doesn’t appear in official measures. It’s clear you can not be holding cash or anything like it. We also are increasingly nervous about intermediate/long yields and whether they will move before inflation does. So far, the Fed is talking a good game to keep them down and people are happy to buy bonds thinking there is security. But when they realize what’s going on, when the deficits balloon, when foreign investors stop cooperating, the crack could be dramatic. Many people who chased "safety" are headed for a crash lesson about "duration" - it’s a multiplier, folks.
We’re trying to think of other ways the mob will come after your prudently stored-up wealth. Inflation takes time, and they want your money now. Tax hikes are the obvious step, but politicians will have to be careful to appear to be taxing the "rich". The problem is there just aren’t enough truly rich to make a difference through income taxes. A capital gains tax will probably come - but who has any capital gains these days? We took all of our capital gains a year ago, when it looked like Hillary would be in the White House. Hope you did too. Quite possibly, an asset tax, of the type already existent in France and Brazil, will be imposed (coupled with handouts to retirees, who are already the group most disadvantaged by the financial crisis).
The BoE announced a plan to start buying corporate sterling debt this month, which left us scratching our heads since there are far worse problems in this country than BT bonds trading at +400bps. At margin, it should be positive for our sterling corporate debt position.
As January was the worst S&P return on record, we are increasing our short in February. VIX levels have made selling volatility marginally attractive, so we are using the options market for that view. We’re hoping to take in 2-5% of AUM in option premium this year.
Our colleagues, and really anyone we talk to, remain unconcerned about inflation. They have a point - there are no indications that prices will start to move up. But politicians are ascendant and mob rule is the order of the day. The mob of unworthy borrowers, imprudent chancers, and inefficient industries wants a bailout and will get one at the expense of those who worked hard and saved prudently. One of the first things they are doing is pilfering your savings, by keeping rates low and printing money. Inflation will come; the thing we are concerned about is whether they will game CPI so it doesn’t appear in official measures. It’s clear you can not be holding cash or anything like it. We also are increasingly nervous about intermediate/long yields and whether they will move before inflation does. So far, the Fed is talking a good game to keep them down and people are happy to buy bonds thinking there is security. But when they realize what’s going on, when the deficits balloon, when foreign investors stop cooperating, the crack could be dramatic. Many people who chased "safety" are headed for a crash lesson about "duration" - it’s a multiplier, folks.
We’re trying to think of other ways the mob will come after your prudently stored-up wealth. Inflation takes time, and they want your money now. Tax hikes are the obvious step, but politicians will have to be careful to appear to be taxing the "rich". The problem is there just aren’t enough truly rich to make a difference through income taxes. A capital gains tax will probably come - but who has any capital gains these days? We took all of our capital gains a year ago, when it looked like Hillary would be in the White House. Hope you did too. Quite possibly, an asset tax, of the type already existent in France and Brazil, will be imposed (coupled with handouts to retirees, who are already the group most disadvantaged by the financial crisis).
The BoE announced a plan to start buying corporate sterling debt this month, which left us scratching our heads since there are far worse problems in this country than BT bonds trading at +400bps. At margin, it should be positive for our sterling corporate debt position.
From the Archive: Small-C 2008 Review
All of the below is true, at least in my mind.
It is a long-reported market observation that “as goes January, so goes the year”. Around 150 years of market data lends that observation statistical significance. No one knows why, but it persists 20 years after it was first studied by academia. After the S&P handed in -6.3% for January, we took the key decision of 2008: short equities. Unfortunately, we waited until about the 12th of February to implement the decision, by which point the S&P had fallen to -8% for the year. Our portfolio, a mix of long S&P, China equity, and small-cap Canadian uranium miners, was down about 12%.
That led to Lesson #1 for the year: once a decision is made, don’t procrastinate on implementation.
We kept our China long, running the S&P / China and nuclear basis in the belief that Asia has many years of robust growth ahead and that the world simply does not produce enough uranium to run its reactors (stockpiles currently make up the shortfall). That bet didn’t work, as China ETFs behaved like super-charged S&P proxy most days, but the net short bias protected our portfolio.
During our February re-allocation, we got into high yield bonds and inflation protected securities (TIPS). Valuations in high yield looked attractive given they priced in worst-in-history levels of defaults, while we were concerned that the US government was about to open up its checkbook and start handing out money left and right. To be charitable, both calls now look premature. Our high yield bonds declined about 20% over the year, costing us almost 4% of AUM, while TIPS declined 4% - about 0.5% of AUM.
In mid May, we became convinced that WTI prices in the 130s were ridiculous. Though gold wasn’t particularly cheap in the 900s, the ratio of oil to gold was hovering 6.5 barrels per ounce. Those were all-time lows versus a long-term average around 10. Failing to find a straightforward oil proxy to short, we invested in Macroshares Oil Down Shares and bought the GLD ETF. The ratio eventually over-corrected to 27 in December, but, long before that, the Oil Down Shares structure had unwound, leaving us with zero only a month after the trade. That mistake cost us around 1% of AUM; the trade should have earned at least 2% of AUM.
Lesson #2 for the year was: read the fine print, and avoid imperfect proxies.
In mid-August, our prime broker imposed new conditions, effectively forcing us out of half of our equity short and threatening the other half. It took a couple of weeks to set up with a new broker. Over that period, the S&P dropped roughly 8%; maintaining the short would have earned us about 2% of AUM.
This wasn’t the first time Ameritrade gave us grief this year; Lesson #3 for the year was: concentrate balances with a broker we trust. Ideally, we would maintain a backup option, but that wouldn’t be economic at our size.
In Q4, we tend to feel an impulse to “do something with options”, which tends to be a disaster. With the VIX breaking all-time highs each day, it was clear that everyone wanted to buy protection. We later learned that even our father bought puts. We started selling puts. On an annualized basis, the yield one could earn on total risk for 10% out-of-the-money S&P puts was above 30%. Not bad, for a trade where the danger is buying an asset that looks fairish-ly priced. That has been a good trade, but the VIX has collapsed, making the strategy far less attractive. We only earned about 0.5% of AUM.
There were other side bets and throughout the year, we weeded out non-core positions from the portfolio – usually at a significant loss. We dabbled in solar energy, pharmas, commodities, Internet stocks, German autos, and fast food. Performance was diverse, but not significant to the portfolio. Lesson #4 for the year was: don’t waste time on trades that can’t make any money. Going forward, we plan to keep about ten trades on the book. We finished the year having lost 15.8% of AUM, a fact we have mixed feelings about. It could have been a lot worse, but we have been set back two years in the investment game. We also came very close to investing in buyout loans. In this case, a colleague and Lesson #2 saved us: the listed loan fund structures included around 50% leverage, which has caused them to implode over the past couple of months. These loans still look pretty attractive, but we can’t figure out a straightforward way to buy them.
Lesson #5 for the year is an overriding theme: whatever scenarios you can imagine, the realm of actual possibilities is unimaginably larger. We continually struggled to cope with outcomes that stretched credulity and burst through the frame on our charts, events like Volkswagen overnight becoming the largest company in the world by market capitalization, on Internet bubble-like valuations. As we recently implored a group of MBA students “don’t be framed”.
Finally, a brief note on our side pocket investments: the decline in the BoE rate has been great for current cash flows, but it’s fair to say that we would suffer a significant loss if forced to realize on UK property in the current environment. It’s also worth remembering this is a long-term project which we believe will survive the cycle.
Our outlook for 2009 is too long to include in this letter, but to summarize, our positioning is:
- flat equities
- long Asia
- long High Yield and Investment grade bonds
- long TIPs and gold
We favor safe income to start the year as economic conditions, demographics and politics will continue to weigh on growth expectations. Inflation will eventually pick up, and rates are looking very low. Trades we are currently examining include shorting treasuries, buying sterling investment grade bonds, and doubling down in China. That gold/oil ratio is looking extremely high now, and it probably isn’t a bad idea to start buying some crude. We hear convertible bonds are very cheap, but aren’t educated enough to make a call.
Operationally, in 2009 we are looking at ways to better manage our portfolio seamlessly across markets, regions and currencies, as well as do a better job of cash management on a holistic basis. This report covers around 95% of our liquid assets; we are examining ways of bringing the remaining bits under tighter scrutiny.